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Abstract
The 2010 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. FEC lifted restrictions on
the funding by unions and corporations of groups engaging in independent political adver-
tising (outside spending). Many have criticized the majority opinion’s premise that outside
spending cannot corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer have examined the impli-
cations of this decision under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-theoretic model of
electoral competition, we show that informative outside spending by a group whose policy
preferences are partially aligned with the electorate may reduce voter welfare. This negative
effect is more likely when policy information is highly valuable for the electorate or congru-
ence between the group and voters is high. We further show that the regulatory environment
produced by the Court’s decision is always suboptimal: the electorate would be better off if
either groups were allowed to coordinated with candidates or if outside spending was banned
altogether.
∗We thank Ethan Bueno de Mesquita as well as conference participants at the Conference in Honor of Norman
Schofield at Washington University, Saint Louis. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. Emails:
cp2928@columbia.edu and s.wolton@lse.ac.uk.
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In Citizens Untied v. FEC (558 U.S. 310), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that regulatory provi-
sions limiting contributions from unions and corporations to groups engaging in outside spending
(i.e., political advertising uncoordinated with candidates’ committees) are unconstitutional.1 To
justify its decision, the majority argued that outside spending is a form of political speech, which
cannot unduly influence the electoral process and is protected by the First Amendment.2
This ruling has been heavily criticized (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2010), and to this day remains highly
controversial (e.g., FEC commissioner Ann Ravel’s letter of resignation on 19 February 2017).
Most critics claim that unrestricted outside spending will reduce, rather than improve, informa-
tion available to the electorate. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting opinion, corporations’
electioneering is likely to “drown out noncorporate voices, [...] generate the impression that cor-
porations dominate our democracy” (Stevens dissenting, p.81).
Few, however, have studied the consequences of facilitating outside spending under the majority
opinion’s assumptions. In this paper, we show that outside spending can reduce voter welfare even
if groups engaged in independent advertising (i) can only provide relevant information regarding
candidates’ proposals and (ii) are more likely than not to share the electorate’s policy preferences.
We further highlight that the negative consequences of Citizens United are more likely to arise
when policy information is highly valuable and credible (congruence between the interest groups
and electorate is high). Finally, we show that the regulatory environment produced by Citizens
United is, under these very assumptions, always suboptimal: voters would be better off if either
outside spending was banned or groups were allowed to coordinate with candidates.
1By outside spending, we mean independent expenditures (defined by the FEC as funding communication
“expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in cooperation,
consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee,
or their agents, or a political party or its agents.”) that qualify as “electioneering communication” (taking place 60
days prior to a general election). The current regulation on outside spending is a result of both Citizens United v.
FEC and SpeechNow.org v. FEC (1:08-cv-00248-JR), with Citizens United v. FEC the key legal precedent.
2Specifically, the Court argued that the launch of an uncoordinated advertising campaign “presupposes that
the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials,” (majority opinion, p.24). As such, “[t]he Government
may not deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration” (Ibid., p.44) and restricting the funding of outside spending “interfere[s] with the ”open marketplace”
of ideas protected by the First Amendment” (Ibid. p.38).
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Our paper joins a small game-theoretical literature examining the consequences of strategic
third-party communication in electoral races. As such, it is distinct from the larger body of work
studying direct contributions by special interests and from approaches predicated on the notion
that electoral spending is primarily persuasive (e.g., Snyder, 1989; Klumpp, 2014). By focusing
on informative spending, our work is closer to Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 6), who
show how candidates cater to an interest group that can educate voters before an election. Unlike
their paper, our model focuses on a pure accountability framework (rather than on ideological
differentiation) with ex-post information provision, and their adverse effect on candidates’ behavior.
Our paper is thus related to a literature highlighting how information provision can have
unintended consequences in models of delegation. Our work, however, differs from previous con-
tributions in one critical dimension. The literature has generally assumed that agents (politicians)
are differentiated in their honesty (Coate and Morris, 1995; Ely and Va¨limaki, 2003), ability (Prat,
2005; Ashworth and Shotts, 2010; Fox and Van Weelden, 2012; Wolton, 2016), or policy preferences
(Boleslavsky and Cotton, 2015). Ex-post information (either about agent’s actions or about their
consequences) then hurts the principal (electorate) because agents harmfully change their behavior
to maintain a good reputation.3 In contrast, in our set-up, candidates are identical and a strategic
interest group only reveals policy relevant information to voters. As such, our results show that
the welfare-reducing effect of additional information can arise even in the absence of reputation
concern. So doing, we generate new predictions such as the negative correlation between the value
or credibility of information and voter welfare.
The model
We consider a one-period model of electoral competition with four players: two candidates (1 and
2), one representative voter, and an interest group (i). To focus on the informative component of
outside spending, our set-up does not incorporate ideological considerations. Candidate j ∈ {1, 2}
is office-motivated and commits either to a safe (pj = 0) or a risky (pj = 1) policy. While the
safe policy provides a sure payoff of 0 to the voter, the impact of the risky policy depends on
3A similar result holds for the analysis of direct democracy (Prato and Strulovici, 2016) or government-opposition
interactions (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve, 2016).
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an underlying state of the world θv ∈ {H,L}. When the risky policy is implemented, the voter
obtains 1 + ∆, ∆ > 0 if the state of the world is high (θv = H), and 1−∆ if θv = L (notice that
∆ can be above 1). For example, the risky policy corresponds to securing subsidies for particular
industries or to revitalize an abandoned industrial site. The economic benefits of such policy are
uncertain: they are large in state θv = H and relatively low in state θv = L. The parameter ∆ > 0
captures, in a reduced form, the policy risk associated with p = 1. Players do not know the state
of the world θv.4 However, it is common knowledge that the state θv is drawn from a uniform
distribution: Pr(θv = H) = 1/2.
The effect of the risky policy on the interest group i also depends on an underlying state
θi ∈ {h, l}, which is the group’s private information. i’s payoff from the risky policy equals 1 when
θi = h and −1 otherwise. It is common knowledge that θi is also drawn from a uniform distribution
(i.e., Pr(θi = h) = 1/2) that is correlated with θv. The degree of congruence between the voter
and group i is captured by (and increasing in) the correlation parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) (see Potters and










The interest group can use outside spending to publicly endorse a policy platform. We denote
by ai ∈ {0, 1, ∅} the group’s advertising strategy, where ai = 1 (ai = 0) corresponds to the interest
group endorsing the risky (safe) policy, and ai = ∅ corresponds to no advertising. Advertising
(ai 6= ∅) is associated with a cost of raising funds c > 0 that depends on the regulatory environ-
ment. Under a ban on union and corporate funding of outside spending, we impose c > 1 (which
guarantees that i never advertises). Absent a ban, we assume c ∈ (0, 1).
The voter’s payoff from candidate j depends on his platform choice pj, the state θ
v, and a valence
shock εj, j ∈ {1, 2}, which captures any additional payoff the voter might receive from candidate j’s
4In Supplemental Appendix B, we show that our results are substantively unchanged when candidates receives
an informative signal of the state of the world.
5While immaterial for the derivation of our main results, the uniformity assumption allows us to parameterize
the correlation between states in a simple way.
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personal attributes or his expected actions on other policy dimensions. We assume that εj is drawn
independently from a continuous Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) with support [0, ε], that
the difference ε := ε1 − ε2 is distributed according to the CDF Fε ∼ [−ε, ε], with an associated
probability density function fε(·) which is symmetric around 0. To simplify the derivation of the
results and rule out uninteresting cases, we also assume that the value of the preference shocks is
not too large or too small: ε ∈ (1− ρ∆, 1).6 The voter’s utility function when she elects j assumes
the following form: uv(j) = pj(1 + ∆− 2∆I{θv=L}) + εj, where I{θv=L} = 1 if θv = L.
A candidate gets 0 when he is not in office. When elected, he gets 1 and his payoff is reduced by
an amount k ∈ (0, 1) when he implements the risky policy. This cost corresponds to the political
capital required to implement a policy initiative (Hall and Deardoff, 2006). Candidate j’s payoff
if elected is then: uj(pj) = 1− kpj.
The interest group’s payoff when candidate j is elected depends on his policy choice pj as well
as the state θi. If it engages in outside spending (ai 6= ∅), the group also pays the cost c. Its utility
function is then ui(a; θi) = pj(1− 2I{θi=l})− cI{a6=∅}.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. (1) Nature draws (θv, θi) ∈ {H,L}×{h, l}
and the valence shocks ε1, ε2. (2) The interest group observes θi. (3) Candidates choose a platform:
pj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ {1, 2}. (4) The voter and the interest group observe (p1, p2). The interest group
chooses a policy endorsement ai ∈ {0, 1, ∅}. (5) The voter observes i’s endorsement and the valence
shocks, and elects a candidate. (6) The elected candidate implements his platform, and payoffs
are realized.
Notice that the interest group intervenes after candidates’ platform choices. This assumption
(whose role is discussed in detail when we evaluate the current regulatory framework) captures
the idea that the interest group cannot coordinate with candidates by directly influencing their
platform choice.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, with two additional requirements.
First, the assessment must satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).7 Second, when
6The valence shock eliminates equilibria relying on peculiar belief structures by making the voter’s indifference
between the two candidates a zero-probability event. The simplifying role of the upper and lower bounds on ε are
discussed in greater details in footnotes 9, 10, and 12.
7Imposing the Intuitive Criterion guarantees that the voter always correctly interprets the group’s endorsement.
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multiple equilibria arise, we select the one associated with the highest expected payoff for the
voter (henceforth, voter welfare)8 In what follows, the term “equilibrium” refers to this class of
equilibria.
Equilibrium with and without a ban
We first determine candidates’ equilibrium behavior under a ban on the funding of outside spending
by corporations and unions. Let ai(θ
i, p1, p2) denote the interest group’s advocacy strategy as a
function of the state θi and candidates’ policy platforms. Under a ban (c > 1) the interest group
never advertises (ai is constant at ∅). As a result, i’s behavior does not convey any additional
information to the voter, who thus relies on her prior. Since the voter then prefers the risky policy,
a candidate proposing the safe policy faces certain defeat when his opponent chooses p = 1. Both
candidates thus converge to the risky policy.9
Proposition 1. Under a ban, in equilibrium both candidates commit to the risky policy: p1 = p2 =
1.
We now study the equilibrium absent a ban. Let pi be the probability that a candidate is
elected when he campaigns on the safe policy, his opponent commits to the risky policy, and the
voter learns that θi = l. Simple computation yields pi = Fε(ρ∆− 1).10
That is, for example, the voter places probability 1 on the group being type θi = h after endorsement a ∈ {0, 1} if
only a type θi = h has an incentive to send costly message a. As a consequence, it eliminates equilibria in which the
group never advertises because the voter (unreasonably) believes that endorsement is uninformative even though,
given the other players’ strategy, only one of the two types θi ∈ {h, l} has an incentive (i.e. a payoff gain) to engage
in costly advertising.
8This requirement helps eliminating equilibria in which both candidates always choose p = 0—which under a
ban exist only for k ≥ 1/2—and allows for a clear comparison across regimes.
9This follows directly from ε < 1. Absent this assumption, Proposition 1 would only hold for k below a certain
threshold. This, however, would not affect the model’s conclusions about the effect of lifting a ban; see footnote 12.
10 After learning θi = l, the voter’s posterior that θv = H is Pr(θv = H|θi = l) = 1−ρ2 . Her expected payoff
from the risky policy is then 1 + 1−ρ2 ∆− 1+ρ2 ∆ = 1− ρ∆, and candidate 1 if he commits to the risky policy while
2 proposes p = 0 is elected if and only if ε1 − ε2 ≥ 1 − ρ∆. The result follows by symmetry of fε(ε). Absent
our assumption ε > 1 − ρ∆, the group’s endorsement would have no effect on the voter’s electoral decision (i.e.,
6
Outside spending only occurs when candidates choose different platforms (otherwise i cannot
influence electoral outcomes): ∀p ∈ {0, 1}, ai(h, p, p) = ai(l, p, p) = ∅. Lemma 1 in the Appendix
shows that when the cost of advertising satisfies c < pi and there is a meaningful policy choice
(p1 6= p2), the interest group engages in outside spending and its endorsement (ai 6= ∅) fully reveals
θi to the voter.
Intuitively, due to their commonality of interests, the interest group can always credibly trans-
mit information to the voter. As a result, outside spending improves the voter’s electoral decision.
Whenever θi = l, outside spending reduces the chances of electing the “wrong” candidate (whose
commitment to the risky policy is either suboptimal or insufficient to compensate a large gap in
valence).11
Having established that outside spending is beneficial taking candidates’ behavior as given, we
study how outside spending affects candidates’ behavior, assuming c < pi in what follows.
Proposition 2. There exists k(ρ∆) ∈ [1−pi, 1), strictly decreasing in ρ∆, such that the equilibrium
probability that a candidate commits to the risky policy absent a ban is strictly positive if and only
if k ≤ k(ρ∆).
Recall that under a ban on outside spending, a candidate wins the election with positive
probability only if he commits to the risky policy. When voter receives policy information through
outside spending, this is no longer the case. Indeed, outside spending has an asymmetric effect
on the electoral rewards associated with each platform choice. When θi = h, the interest group’s
behavior does not affect the already high winning probability of a candidate committing to p =
1. In contrast, when θi = l, outside spending strictly improves (from 0 to the strictly positive
probability pi) the electoral chances of a candidate who chooses the safe policy against an opponent
committing to the risky policy. This directly implies that a candidate only obtains a moderate
a candidate proposing the safe policy always loses against a candidate committing to the risky policy) and the
presence of a ban on outside spending would be inconsequential.
11Under our equilibrium concept, i’s advertising strategy is not uniquely pinned down. However, there exists an
equilibrium in which i only incurs outside spending to endorse the safe policy when θi = l (that is ai(h, p1, p2) = ∅
and ai(l, p1, p2) = 0 ∀p1 6= p2). This seems in line with recent evidence on outside spending being substantially
issue-based and aimed at reducing voter support for a given candidate (Dalton and McIlwain, 2011; Brooks and
Murov, 2012).
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electoral reward for proposing the risky policy even if his opponent proposes the safe policy. When
the cost of implementing p = 1 satisfies k > k(ρ∆), this electoral reward is too low relative to the
cost. The unique equilibrium then features both candidates offering p = 0.
Ironically, due to the lack of additional policy information, under a ban, the risky policy is the
only electorally viable bet from the perspective of candidates when facing an opponent committing
to p = 1. In contrast, when the voter receives information about the risky policy via outside
spending, she can condition her electoral response to the group’s endorsement. This, in turn, spills
over into the candidates’ incentives: proposing the safe policy while facing a 50/50 chance of being
endorsed by the group becomes a viable electoral strategy.
Further, upon learning θi = l, the voter’s evaluation of the risky policy becomes more negative
the higher the policy risk (∆) or congruence with the interest group (ρ). As a result, the electoral
benefit of committing to the risky policy for a candidate is decreasing in ρ∆, and so is the threshold
k(ρ∆) for any candidate to propose p = 1.12
Despite the above result, one might suspect that whenever candidates have some electoral
incentives to propose the risky policy absent a ban (i.e., k ≤ k(ρ∆)), outside spending increases
voter welfare by decreasing the probability that p = 1 is implemented when it is less beneficial.
This intuition, however, is not complete since the interest group intervenes only if candidates
propose different platforms. Hence, k ≤ k(ρ∆) is only necessary, but not sufficient, for outside
spending to benefit the voter.
Proposition 3. There exist unique D∗ ∈ (1, 1 + ε) and k∗ ∈
(
1−pi
2−pi , 1 − pi
)
, such that the voter
welfare absent a ban is
(i) strictly higher than under a ban if and only if ρ∆ ∈ (D∗, 1 + ε) and k ∈ (k∗, 1− pi);
(ii) strictly lower than under a ban if k > k(ρ∆);
(iii) the same as under a ban, otherwise.
12This result does not depend on the assumption that ε < 1. It holds as long as outside spending has a greater
impact on the winning probability of a candidate proposing the safe policy than on the winning probability of a
candidate proposing the risky policy. Further, outside spending has no effect when the voter prefers the safe policy
absent additional information. Under a ban, both candidates propose p = 0 and are elected with probability 1/2.
Candidates would still propose p = 0 absent a ban since when they commit to the risky policy, they are elected
only when the state is θi = h—i.e., with probability at most 1/2—and the risky policy is costly to implement.
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Two conditions need to be satisfied for outside spending to improve voter welfare. First,
candidates must propose different platforms with positive probability, so the interest group has an
incentive to engage in outside spending. In this set-up, platform divergence requires candidates to
play a mixed strategy and can only happen if the policy cost is sufficiently large (k ∈ (k∗, k(ρ∆))).
Second, the informational gain from learning θi must be high enough to compensate for the risk
that no candidate proposes p = 1 (ρ∆ > D∗).
These results do not automatically invalidate the Supreme Court’s arguments in favor of remov-
ing restrictions on the source of funding of outside spending. However, they provide restrictions on
observables under which these arguments are likely to be correct. In particular, in the Appendix
(see Corollary 1) we show that in order to be beneficial, outside spending needs to be “rare,” in
the sense that it has to happen with probability strictly lower than 1/2.13 Finally, even if Citizens
United has increased voter welfare, the campaign finance framework may still be inefficient from
a social welfare perspective, as the next section now shows.
Evaluating the current regulation
In this section, we allow for coordination between the interest group and candidates. In particular,
we assume that in stage 2 of the game (see Model section) the interest group can send a cheap
talk message mi(j) ∈ {h, l} to candidate j ∈ {1, 2}, and focus on the most informative equilibrium
strategy. To allow for the possibility of outside spending in equilibrium, we continue to assume
that c < pi.
Coordination increases the interest group’s ability to obtain its preferred policy. The group
can use messages to “warn” candidates that the policy reduces its payoff (the state θi = l), and
credibly signal that should a candidate commit to the risky policy, the group will endorse his
opponent. Such strategy, however, can be supported in equilibrium only when the policy cost k
is large enough (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Intuitively, when k is too small relative to the
electoral return of choosing the safe policy (pi), proposing the risky policy is always a dominant
strategy for both candidates.14 Proposition 4 examines the welfare consequences of allowing for
13This result is due to the candidates’ mixing strategy, not the uniform distribution of the states.
14Notice that absent outside spending, group i would lack the ability to influence candidates’ action via the
9
coordination between candidates and the interest group.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium,
(i) if ρ∆ > 1, the voter welfare is strictly higher absent a ban when coordination is allowed than
without coordination or under a ban.
(ii) if ρ∆ ≤ 1, the voter welfare is higher under a ban than absent a ban without coordination
(strictly if k > k(ρ∆)) or with coordination (strictly if k > 1− 2pi).
Proposition 4 implies that the current campaign finance legislation is inefficient. If the infor-
mational gain from learning θi is low (ρ∆ ≤ 1), then reducing the cost of outside spending harms
the electorate. Conversely, if the group’s private information is highly valuable to the electorate
(ρ∆ > 1), voters would be better off if coordination was permitted.
This last result highlights the importance of the timing assumptions. When i can engage
in outside spending before candidates choose their platform, direct communication is no longer
beneficial for voters. This, however, does not invalidate the reasoning in this section. Allowing
for coordination is still Pareto improving because it induces the same candidate behavior without
on path costly outside spending. Further, our set-up, where advertising expenditures occurs after
platform choices, focuses specifically on the type of outside spending affected by Citizens United. A
group’s advertising prior to candidates’ platform decision is more closely related to policy advocacy,
which was already protected by the First Amendment prior to the 2010 Supreme Court’s decision.
This observation also implies that Proposition 4 holds even when we incorporate the group’s
payoff in our welfare criteria. Indeed, whenever coordination improves the voter welfare, it also
improves the joint welfare since the group obtains its preferred policy at no cost. Further, under
our payoff assumption, the group is indifferent (ex-ante) between the risky policy and the safe
policy. Consequently, lifting a ban has no effect on the group’s payoff whenever it hurts the voter
by eliminating all candidates’ incentive to offer the risky policy.
voter’s beliefs. Coordination can affect candidates’ platforms only when complemented by outside spending.
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Conclusion
Most of the current debate on the role of outside spending revolves around two themes: (i) whether
corporations and unions’ rights and policy interest coincide with—or at least deserve the same
protection as—those of American citizens’ (see, for example, Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion
on Citizens United v. FEC ) and (ii) whether outside spending is really uncoordinated, rather
than a vehicle to circumvent existing regulation (Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Heineman, 2012). Few
studies examine the impact of outside spending under the assumptions that it provides useful
policy information to the electorate. We show that that under these assumptions lifting a ban on
unions and corporations’ funding of outside spending can be harmful for voters, especially when
interest groups and the electorate’s preferences are well aligned. We also show that the regulatory
framework resulting from Citizens United is either too permissive (if congruence between voters
and interest groups is low) or too restrictive (if congruence is high), and in all cases inefficient.
While capturing important aspects of the delegation problem between voters and politicians,
our theory does not incorporate partisanship or adverse selection, nor is it equipped to analyze
incremental changes in the cost of outside spending. Future work could incorporate these aspects in
our parsimonious framework. Another promising avenue for future research consists in studying the
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